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THE SECOND CIRCUIT RUBS OUT CIVIL
RICO: SEDIMA, S.P.RL. V. IMREX CO.
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)1 was designed to eliminate the infiltration of organized
crime into legitimate business enterprises.2 Section 1962 of RICO
makes it unlawful for any person to take over or operate an enter-
prise through a "pattern of racketeering activity,"3 which is
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act is part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1826 and scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (1982)). Con-
cerning the use of the acronym RICO, District Judge Shadur stated that "this Court has
always suspected the person who christened the legislation was a movie buff with a sense of
humor. In 'Little Caesar,' the first Hollywood gangster movie of the early thirties (a proto-
type that spawned an entire genre), Edward G. Robinson played the thinly-disguised Al
Capone leading role-and was named 'Rico.'" Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F.
Supp. 20, 21 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. at 923.
2 See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. at 923. The purpose of the Act is described as
"seek[ing] the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal
tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by pro-
viding enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime." See Note, RICO: An Introduction and Description, 52 Ar-
TRUST L.J. 303, 304 (1983) (purpose of RICO is to stop infiltration of organized crime into
business, unions, and government); see also McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or
its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NoTRE DAM LAW. 55, 141 (1970) (RICO
aimed at removing organized crime from legitimate organizations).
3 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1963 (1982). Section 1962 provides in part:
(a)It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, di-
rectly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of
an unlawful debt in which such a person has participated as a principal ... to use
or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise .
Id. § 1962(a).
"'Enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other le-
gal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity." Id. § 1961(4). The term enterprise encompasses private businesses, government
agencies, and labor unions. See Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TsEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1023
(1980). In addition, the enterprise in question may be either legitimate or illegitimate.
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-81 (1981). The Supreme Court in Turkette
held that, based on the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, both legitimate and
illegitmate enterprises are covered, and noted that Congress could easily have narrowed the
sweep of the definition simply by inserting "legitimate." Id.
The predicate acts under RICO consist of 24 federal and eight state crimes. 18 U.S.C. §
1961(1) (1982). The most controversial aspect of § 1961 is the incorporation of so-called
1985] CIVIL RICO
broadly defined within section 1961 as the commission of at least
two so-called predicate acts within a ten year period.4 In addition
to criminal sanctions for violations of its standards,5 section 1964
(civil RICO) provides that treble damages and reasonable attor-
ney's fees be awarded to anyone injured "by reason of" proscribed
RICO activity.( The broad definition of "racketeering activity"
contained within RICO has enabled an increasing number of plain-
tiffs to initiate civil RICO suits that have involved various legiti-
mate enterprises as defendants and have encompassed a wide vari-
ety of fraudulent conduct.7 Recently, however, in Sedima, S.P.R.L.
"garden variety fraud," such as mail fraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982), and wire fraud, see
id. § 1345, into the list of "racketeering activities." See Note, Civil RICO and "Garden
Variety" Fraud-A Suggested Analysis, 58 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 93, 122 (1983).
4 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). Section 1961(5) defines a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity as requiring at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the
effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years, excluding any
period of imprisonment, after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity. Id.
Some courts and commentators maintain that the predicate acts must be connected by a
"common scheme, plan or motive." See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 3, at 1030 (quoting
United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afl'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976)).
5 See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982).
6 See id. § 1964(c). Section 1964(a) provides that the district court may order "any
person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise;. . . [prohibit]
any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in. . . ; or
[order] dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights
of innocent persons." Id. § 1964(a).
7 Compare Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restric-
tion, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1101, 1101 n.7 (1982) (before 1978, only two opinions dealing with
civil RICO were rendered) with Siegel, "RICO" Running Amok in the Board Rooms, L.A.
Times, Feb. 15, 1984, at col. 1 (as of 1984, there have been over 100 published decisions
concerning civil RICO).
Reacting to an increase in civil RICO litigation, some courts have attempted to limit the
use of the provision. See, e.g., Guerrero v. Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714, 718 (D.D.C. 1983) (to
have standing plaintiff must plead RICO injury or "racketeering enterprise injury"); Noland
v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210, 218 (D. Colo. 1983) (standing for treble-damage claim requires
pleading of § 1962-type infiltration and damage to business); Harper v. New Japan Sec.
Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (standing under RICO requires an alle-
gation of racketeering injury); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125,
1136 (D. Mass. 1982) (business type injury required for standing in RICO action); North
Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 210-11 (N.D. IlM. 1980) (showing of com-
petitive injury).
In addition to concern over the increasing number of civil RICO claims, courts and
commentators have noted that a broad interpretation of civil RICO permits plaintiffs to
bring claims traditionally limited to state jurisdictions into federal court. See Van Schaick,
533 F. Supp. at 1137; Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. at 210; see also Note, supra note 3, at 122
(rejecting interpretation that allows all fraud within RICO); Note, supra, at 1104 (RICO
federalizes common-law fraud). The inclusion of mail and wire fraud violations as RICO
predicate offenses, the widespread use of wire and mail in business enterprises, and the
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v. Imrex Co.,8 the Second Circuit imposed severe restrictions on
the availability of civil RICO by requiring that plaintiffs establish
that the defendant has been criminally convicted of predicate of-
fenses and that he has caused a separate injury by reason of his
racketeering activity.9
relative ease by which one may perpetrate these frauds are all factors contributing to the
proliferation of common-law fraud claims under RICO. See Note, supra note 3, at 123. It
has been suggested that to alleviate this alleged misuse of the federal courts, predicate acts
of fraud should be required to be accompanied by non-fraud predicate acts, such as arson,
extortion, interstate transportation of stolen goods, or sale or receipt of stolen goods,
thereby providing a federal forum for fraud accompanied by violence while excluding ordi-
nary business fraud. See id. at 126 (citing ABA: Report to the House of Delegates, Section
on Criminal Justice 7-9 (1982)).
Moreover, it has been suggested that the inclusion of securities fraud within RICO
would result in a disruption of the securities laws in cases in which RICO is broadly con-
strued. See Note, RICO and Securities Fraud: A Workable Limitation, 83 COLUM. L. REv.
1513, 1530 (1983); Note, supra note 3, at 112. But see Long, Treble Damages for Violations
of the Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis and Application of the RICO Civil
Cause of Action, 85 DIcgL L. Rav. 201, 205-06 (1981) (suggesting methods for converting
security fraud cases into racketeering cases). The Supreme Court has cautioned that ex-
panding the availability of private securities actions under rule 10b-5 by eliminating various
standing requirements would naturally cause plaintiffs to seek merely "conjectural and spec-
ulative" awards that would clearly be inappropriate. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734-35 (1975).
8 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 901 (1985).
9 Id. Sedima is the seminal case in a trilogy of civil RICO cases decided by the Second
Circuit on consecutive days. See Bankers Trust v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984);
Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984). The cases were denied consideration en
banc. Furman, 741 F.2d at 525.
In Bankers Trust, the defendant, Braten Apparel Corporation (BAC), was indebted to
the plaintiff, Bankers Trust, in the amount of 4 million dollars. Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at
513. Two officers of BAC and their attorney devised a scheme by which BAC could avoid its
indebtedness by fraudulently filing a bankruptcy petition under the then applicable Chapter
XI of the Bankruptcy Act. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 1-1103 (1976). After the scheme was success-
fully enacted, Bankers Trust brought an action demanding treble damages and attorney's
fees pursuant to § 1964(c). 741 F.2d at 514-15.
Writing for the majority, Judge Kearse affirmed the decision of the district court, hold-
ing that, to maintain a civil RICO action, the plaintiff must not only show two violations of
the predicate offenses within 10 years, but also must allege a "distinct RICO injury." Id. at
515-16. Judge Kearse defined this as a "proprietary injury caused by some of RICO's essen-
tial elements." Id. at 516. In dissent, Judge Cardamone relied on the language of the statute
and concluded that the requirement of the majority was an unwarranted exercise of judicial
authority. Id. at 523 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
In Furman v. Cirrito, Judge Pratt, although affirming a district court opinion based on
the controlling opinions of Sedima and Bankers Trust, dissented from the decision not to
hear the case en banc. Furman, 741 F.2d at 525 (Pratt, J., dissenting from the denial of en
banc consideration). Reading the purpose of RICO more broadly than either Judges Oakes
or Kearse, Judge Pratt contended that the statute was designed not merely with the intent
of destroying organized crime, but also to eradicate fraud, and concluded that to restrict the
purposefully broad language of RICO by requiring a showing of something in addition to the
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In Sedima, plaintiff Sedima and defendant Imrex were parties
to a joint venturel ° pursuant to which Imrex shipped electrical
parts to Sedima in Belgium.11 Sedima contended that it had been
defrauded by Imrex through Imrex's practice of overstating the
purchase price, shipping costs, and finance charges of the parts.12
Moreover, Sedima alleged that Imrex, through its fraudulent state-
ments, had received money that rightfully belonged to the joint
venture.13 In addition to claims of breach of contract and conver-
sion, Sedima alleged that the defendant's conduct constituted a
"pattern of racketeering activity" in violation of civil RICO. 14 The
district court, however, granted Imrex's motion to dismiss the
RICO claim on the ground that the plaintiff had merely alleged a
violation of the predicate offenses without alleging a separate
"RICO-type" injury.15 Sedima appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.
Writing for the majority, Judge Oakes concluded from the leg-
islative history that Congress neither foresaw nor intended the cur-
rent widespread use of civil RICO actions.' 6 While noting that
RICO was designed to combat organized crime, Judge Oakes ob-
served that RICO has evolved into an effective means to sue legiti-
predicate offenses would undermine civil RICO. Id. at 529-31 (Pratt, J., dissenting from the
denial of en banc consideration).
10 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496.




15 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 574 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), afl'd, 741 F.2d 480
(2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 901 (1985). Sedima alleged that the mailing of fraud-
ulent purchase orders and credit memoranda constituted predicate acts upon which a RICO
claim could be based. 574 F. Supp. at 965. Although acts of mail fraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1982), are included in § 1961(1)(d) among the list of violations that would constitute "rack-
eteering activity," District Judge Glasser refused to find a valid RICO cause of action, id. at
965. The court relied on two constructions of the phrase "RICO-type injury": first, those
that require either a racketeering enterprise injury in which "a civil RICO defendant's abil-
ity to harm the plaintiff is enhanced by the infusion of money from a pattern of racketeer-
ing acts into the enterprise," and, second, a competitive injury occurring when the plaintiff
is forced to compete with an infusion of funds from racketeering activity. Id.
"6 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 485-94. Judge Oakes noted that the silence of Congress on the
creation of a "federal forum ... for so many common law wrongs" was indicative of a fail-
ure to perceive the implications of civil RICO. Id. at 492. The majority maintained that the
failure of Congress to mention the addition of a civil cause of action until the middle of the
second to last day of its discussions of the bill indicated that it did not intend as dramatic
results for civil RICO as some contend. Id. at 490-91. Rather, the court asserted that "[t]he
most important and evident conclusion to be drawn from the legislative history is that the
Congress was not aware of the possible implications of section 1964(c)." Id. at 492.
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mate business enterprises in federal, rather than state, court.1" Re-
sponding to what it perceived as a widespread and unforeseen
misuse of the statute,18 the Sedima court read the "by reason of"
language in section 1964(c) as requiring that plaintiffs in civil
RICO suits demonstrate an injury caused by "racketeering activ-
ity," 9 which the court defined as an activity in which "mobsters,
either through the infiltration of legitimate enterprises or through
the activities of illegitimate enterprises, cause systematic harm to
competition. '20
The Sedima court further limited the use of civil RICO by es-
tablishing criminal convictions of predicate offenses as a condition
precedent to a civil suit.21 Comparing the language of the Clayton
17 Id. at 487. The inclusion of state and federal law violations within RICO, Judge
Oakes observed, allows plaintiffs to bring many claims in federal court that previously
would have been "subject only to state jurisdiction." Id. at 486. In addition, the majority
held that there is no consensus among the courts concerning what is required to maintain a
civil RICO action, and listed four types of limitations placed on RICO by various courts:
(1) whether RICO requires some nexus between the challenged activity and
organized crime; (2) whether the injury complained of must result from "enter-
prise" involvement in the racketeering, rather than directly from the activity it-
self; (3) whether plaintiffs must allege a "competitive" or "racketeering injury";
and (4) whether there must be criminal convictions for the predicate acts underly-
ing a civil RICO suit.
Id. at 492; see supra note 7.
18 See 741 F.2d at 494. Judge Oakes supported many of the district courts that have
maintained that standing under RICO should be limited to those "hurt by an injury of the
type RICO was intended to prevent." Id.
19 Id. at 494-95. Section 4 of the Clayton Act was the source of the "by reason of"
language used in RICO. Id. at 494. The Supreme Court has defined the phrase "by reason
of" in the context of the Clayton Act as an "'injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent.'" Id. at 495 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477, 489 (1977)). The Sedima court, by analogy, concluded that as used in RICO, the
language is "intended to limit standing to those injured by a 'racketeering injury' [which
Congress defined as an injury] of the type RICO was designed to prevent." Sedima, 741 F.2d
at 495 (emphasis added).
20 741 F.2d at 495-96. Despite the use of the word "competition," the court emphasized
that there was no requirement of a showing of competitive injury of the type required by
the antitrust laws. Id. But see North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211
(N.D. Ill. 1980) (there must be an injury showing how plaintiff was injured competitively by
the RICO violation).
1 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496. In concluding that a prior criminal conviction was neces-
sary, Judge Oakes distinguished Sedima from a leading case, United States v. Cappetto, 502
F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975), which held that such a
requirement was not warranted, id. Judge Oakes limited the holding in Cappetto, stating
that it dealt solely with the right of the government, in the absence of a criminal conviction,
to sue for an injunction under § 1964(a), while Sedima concerned solely an individual seek-
ing damages in a private civil action. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496-97. The court noted that in
RICO actions brought by the government, both prosecutorial discretion and guidelines es-
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Act, which was an acknowledged influence on RICO, Judge Oakes
concluded that the use of the word "violation" in section 1964(c) of
RICO, as opposed to the "anything forbidden" language of the
Clayton Act, evinced a congressional intent to require a prior crim-
inal conviction.22 The Sedima court noted that permitting a civil
RICO suit without a prior criminal conviction would necessitate
dual burdens of proof, which the court reasoned would render
RICO trials unintelligible to a jury.23 Moreover, despite the exis-
tence of a liberal construction clause,24 the court asserted that to
determine a defendant's criminality in a civil suit would implicate
constitutional issues.25 Applying its criteria to the facts of the case,
tablished by the Department of Justice are used, and these protect defendants from an
overly broad use of RICO. Id. Private claimants, on the other hand, are not similarly lim-
ited. Id.
Other cases holding that criminal convictions are not necessary as a condition precedent
were distinguished by the court by maintaining that they merely relied on Cappetto, and
therefore were inapplicable. Id. at 497.
22 741 F.2d at 498 (emphasis in original). Section 1964(c) provides: "Any person injured
in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may...
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (emphasis added); see Harper v. New Japan Sec.
Int'l, 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982). The Harper court held that, at its inception,
RICO was intended to be an antitrust statute, since comparing § 1964(c) of RICO with § 4
of the Clayton Act reveals virtually identical language. 545 F. Supp. at 1007. It is generally
held, however, that despite some similarity, RICO is not rendered susceptible to the literal
requirement of "antitrust injury" under the Clayton Act. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note
3, at 1040. Rather, it has been held that the Clayton Act should be used as a starting point
in the examination of RICO. Id.
The Sedima court did concede that the use of the term "violation" could plausibly be
explained as simply a shorthand way of saying "by reason of anything forbidden," see 741
F.2d at 498-99, but maintained that the more compelling interpretation would require con-
viction of the predicate offenses, id. at 498. In addition, the court, based on the use of the
terms "indictable" and "chargeable" in RICO, maintained that Congress did not intend to
give civil courts the ability to determine if an act was indictable or chargeable without an
actual indictment. Id. at 499-500.
23 741 F.2d at 499-501 & n.52 (citing United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 356
n.36 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. 423 U.S. 1050 (1976)).
The Sedima court stated that without a criminal conviction, there is no way of knowing
if the conduct at issue was in fact criminal, and therefore a prior conviction must be re-
quired. 741 F.2d at 501. Moreover, Judge Oakes contended that. in the absence of a criminal
conviction, a civil RICO plaintiff would be required to carry a burden of proof equal to that
of a criminal case for some elements of the cause of action, and yet be required to maintain
only a civil burden for the other elements of the trial. Id. at 501-02.
" See Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970).
2' Sedima, 741 F.2d at 502 (citing Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REy. 291, 309
(1983)). One commentator has noted that when a statute gives rise to both criminal and civil
remedies, the Constitution requires that the civil remedies be strictly construed. Tarlow,
supra, at 310.
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the Sedima court found neither a prior criminal conviction of a
predicate offense nor an establishment of racketeering activity, and
therefore affirmed the district court's dismissal of the RICO
claim.26
Dissenting, Judge Cardamone concluded that the majority's
holding ignored both the plain meaning of the statute as well as
sound policy reasons underlying the creation of a civil cause of ac-
tion.2 7 The dissent asserted that the plain language of the statute
contained no requirement of a prior criminal conviction, and noted
that such a requirement had been rejected by almost every court
that had addressed the issue. 8 Moreover, the dissenting judge con-
tended that the use of the words "indictable" and "offense" in sec-
tion 1964 indicated that the prior criminal conviction of a civil
RICO defendant was not required.2e Finally, the dissent main-
tained that the majority's requirement of a "racketeering injury"
in effect required a connection with organized crime, a requirement
that had been specifically rejected by Congress."
26 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 483.
27 Id. at 504 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 505 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). The dissent maintained that although United
States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975), involved
a government prosecution of RICO actions, see supra note 21, other circuits had applied the
reasoning of Cappetto in private civil RICO cases, id. at 504-05 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
In addition, Judge Cardamone maintained that in suits by the government, a defendant was
entitled to more protection from abuse of power than in suits by private individuals, and,
therefore, he asserted the holding of Cappetto should be given additional weight in private
suits. Id. (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
29 741 F.2d at 505 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). In refuting the contention of the major-
ity that the existence of both civil and criminal burdens of proof would cause the jury to be
utterly confused, Judge Cardamone indicated that the use of both criminal and civil sanc-
tions was not uncommon. Id. (Cardamone, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissent main-
tained that Congress clearly intended § 1964(c) to be a civil statute, and the risk that defen-
dants in RICO actions would be subject to ridicule did not alone render the civil statute
criminal. Id. at 508 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (citing Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S.
422 (1956)). Judge Cardamone noted that "[t]o be named as a RICO defendant is not quite
the Sword of Damocles that the majority would have it." 741 F.2d at 508 (Cardamone, J.,
dissenting).
The dissent concluded that § 1964 was not criminal, id. and applied the test enunciated
in United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980), 741 F.2d at 506-07 (Cardamone, J.,
dissenting). The Ward Court promulgated a two-step test to determine whether a statute is
criminal: (1) did Congress, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicate a preference
for either a criminal or civil label?, and (2) if the priference is civil, did Congress neverthe-
less provide for sanctions so punitive as to transform "the civil remedy into a criminal pen-
alty?" Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49.
"0 See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 509 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). Judge Cardamone sug-
gested that by requiring a showing of an injury caused "'by reason of conduct the RICO act
was designed to prevent,'" and defining this activity by reference to mobster infiltration,
CIVIL RICO
In limiting the availability of civil RICO, the Sedima court
was reacting to a widely perceived misuse of the statute.3' None-
theless, it is submitted that the court has created limitations on
civil RICO that go far beyond those intended by Congress. It is
suggested that by requiring a criminal conviction of predicate acts,
the Sedima court has ignored established principles of statutory
construction, the legislative history of the statute, and prior case
law. In addition, it is submitted that the court's construction of
section 1964, which it claimed necessitated injury "by reason of"
racketeering activity, is void for vagueness; and, it is suggested, the
court's de facto requirement of a connection with organized crime
creates an unconstitutional "status offense."
THE REQUIREMENT OF A PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVICTION
It is an established principle of statutory construction that
"absent clear evidence of a contrary legislative intention, a statute
should be interpreted according to its plain language. '32 The
Sedima court, however, did not begin its analysis with the plain
language of RICO, but instead began by comparing the language of
section 1964 to that of the Clayton Act, upon which section 1964
was modelled.3 3 Specifically, the court compared the phrase "by
reason of anything forbidden" in the Clayton Act with the "by rea-
son of a violation" language in section 1964 of RICO, and thereby
concluded that Congress had included the word "violation" to
manifest its intent to require a prior criminal conviction.34 The
the majority was merely requiring an "organized crime" connection despite the fact that
"other courts, the statute's congressional sponsors and commentators do not assign to civil
RICO a scope on such a lilliputian scale." Id. (Cardamone, J., dissenting). The dissent con-
tended that Congress specifically chose not to use the phrase "'for which an indictment or
information has been returned or filed.'" Id. at 505 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added). Rather, Judge Cardamone suggested that if Congress had intended to require a
prior criminal conviction, it would not have used the words "indictable" or "chargeable,"
but "indicted" or "charged," and would have titled § 1964 "Post Criminal Conviction Civil
Remedies," rather than "Civil Remedies." Id. (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
'1 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
'2 See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (if statutory language unam-
biguous, it must be regarded as conclusive); United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 121
(1980) (absent contrary intention of Congress, statute should be interpreted according to its
plain language); Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 65 (1958) (Court must give effect to
literal meaning of words employed to effectuate intent of Congress).
" See infra note 34 & accompanying text.
Sedima, 741 F.2d at 498-99.
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RICO statute, however, does not define "violation. 3 5 Indeed, the
literal meaning of the term does not denote a criminal conviction,
but rather an "infringement" or a "breach of a right or a duty.""6
In addition, the mandate of Congress that RICO be "liberally con-
strued to effectuate its remedial purposes"3  offers compelling evi-
dence that an expansive reading should be given to the language of
the statute, and therefore a prior criminal conviction should not be
required. 8
Section 1964 does not make reference to its own criminal pro-
visions, but rather conditions civil liability on the "prohibited ac-
tivities" described in section 1962.39 It is suggested that if Congress
had intended to require a prior criminal conviction it would have
done so by referring to the criminal provisions of section 1963, or
by defining "violation" to include convictions, or simply by stating
that criminal convictions were required.40 Finally, it is submitted
that case law does not support the holding of the Sedima court.
Those courts that have addressed the issue have been virtually
11 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1964 (1982).
386 See, e.g., Parnes v. Heinold Commodities Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
The Parnes court concluded that a "fair reading" of § 1962 indicates that the term violation
"is not tantamount to conviction." Id.; see also BLACK'S LAW DiMONARY 1408 (5th ed. 1979)
(violation defined as "injury; infringement; breach of right, duty or law").
37 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970).
38 Cf. Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167, 168,
170 (1980). A liberal construction clause was included to "strengthen RICO's effectiveness,"
hence, courts should give an expansive interpretation to the language of the statute. Id. at
168-70. While a liberal reading of RICO would reinforce congressional intent to destroy or-
ganized crime, id. at 184, strict construction often relies on "fine technicalities and dubious
distinctions" and limits the effectiveness of a statute, id. at 181. In addition, since there
exists no constitutional barrier to Congress providing interpretation clauses, courts are
clearly bound by them. Id. at 184. See generally Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of
Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REV. 748, 762-70 (1935) (supporting abrogation of rule of strict
construction for penal statutes). The broad scope of RICO was acknowledged by Congress.
See 116 CONG. REc. 35,204-05 (1970) (statement of Representative Mikva) (criticizing broad
scope of RICO). Senators Hart and Kennedy recognized and took exception to the broad
reach of RICO as "[going] beyond organized criminal activity." S. RET. No. 617, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 215 (1969).
39 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982); see also id. § 1962 (prohibited activities enumerated).
0 See State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 675
(N.D. Ind. 1982). The State Farm court noted that there is no reference in § 1964 to the
criminal provisions of RICO and that § 1962 refers to "unlawful," not criminal, activities.
See id.; see also USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir.
1982). The USACO court supported a literal reading of RICO, and, based on the fact that
Congress made reference only to the unlawful acts of § 1962, concluded that the civil reme-
dies of RICO were designed to be independent of criminal proceedings. See USACO Coal
Co., 689 F.2d at 95 n.1; see also Sedima, 741 F.2d at 505-06 (Cardamone, J., dissenting)
(civil courts need not determine that predicate acts are criminal).
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unanimous in their rejection of a prior criminal conviction
requirement.41
Congress enacted a civil provision within RICO to provide pri-
vate citizens their own means to seek redress for injuries caused by
organized crime.42 In so doing, Congress recognized that criminal
law, with its attendant procedural safeguards, is not always the
most efficient tool for eradicating organized crime.43 By imposing a
prior criminal conviction as a prerequisite to a civil RICO suit the
Sedima court imposed a requirement that, it is suggested, has the
effect of emasculating the utility of the civil provision of RICO. 44 A
civil RICO plaintiff, for example, could be denied the right to bring
an otherwise legitimate cause of action simply because the govern-
ment chose not to prosecute for reasons related to any number of
procedural technicalities relevant to a criminal proceeding that
have no bearing on the merits of a civil action. 5
THE RACKETEERING ACTIVITY REQUIREMENT
The primary purpose of RICO is to obliterate organized crime,
yet Congress declined either specifically to define organized crime
or to proscribe membership or involvement in organized crime per
41 See, e.g., USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir.
1982) (prior criminal conviction not prerequisite to civil RICO suit); State Farm Fire and
Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 675 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (plain language of §
1962 does not require criminal conviction of predicate offenses); Parnes v. Heinold Com-
modities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (language of Act does not condition
civil cause of action on previous conviction).
2 See supra note 2; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
3 See Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Relating to the Control of Organized
Crime in the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 106-07 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan) [hereinafter cited as Hear-
ings]. Senator McClellan stated that in light of the Mafia's preeminent position, it was ap-
parent that existing criminal sanctions for organized crime were basically inadequate, due to
the the nature of the procedure and the limited scope of criminal remedies. See id. at 106;
see also The Use of Civil Remedies in Organized Crime Control, NATIONAL AssocIATION OF
ATrORNEYS GENERAL 2 (1975). It has been suggested that organized crime is an "economic
phenomenon" and that the best way to solve the problem is to make it unprofitable. Civil
Remedies, supra, at 2.
4 See N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1984 (Op. Ed.), at 24.
"' Cf. Hearings, supra note 43, at 106-07. Representative McClellan's testimony clearly
indicates that Congress' intent in enacting the civil provision was to create a more effective
tool to fight organized crime. See id. This was to be accomplished by circumventing the
safeguards necessitated by criminal law. See id. It is submitted, therefore, that if plaintiffs
are required to wait until the defendant is tried and convicted according to the procedures
required by criminal law, the purpose of the civil action will not be achieved.
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se within RICO.46 This refusal, it is suggested, reflects an aware-
ness that Congress could not effectively do so in a constitutional
manner that was neither void for vagueness nor violative of the
constitutional prohibition against "status offenses."47 Congress,
therefore, chose to provide remedies for those who suffered from
acts typically associated with organized crime.48 It is submitted
that the Sedima court's requirement of an injury "by reason of
racketeering activity" ignores this fact and has, in effect, read into
RICO the requirement of an organized crime connection, 49 a re-
46 See United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976). The Campanale court noted that, in enacting RICO, Congress
proscribed activities that are typically engaged in by individuals and associations involved
in organized crime, id., but, nevertheless, made these activities illegal regardless of who en-
gages in them, id.; see Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313 (N.D.
Ill. 1979) (RICO makes specific acts unlawful); see also Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 529
(2d Cir. 1984) (Pratt, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc consideration) (RICO not
aimed at racketeers per se, but at "racketeering activity").
'" See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 35,344 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). Representative Poff,
opposing a proposal by Representative Biaggi that Congress make membership in the Mafia
or Cosa Nostra illegal, expressed the belief that such a law would not withstand constitu-
tional requirements. Id.; see Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 n.17 (2d Cir. 1983)
(Rep. Biaggi's proposed amendment vigorously attacked on constitutional grounds during
House debates), cert. denied sub nom. 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984). For a further discussion of the
legislative history of RICO, see also Maxwell v. Southwest Nat'l Bank, 593 F. Supp. 250, 255
n.2 (D. Kan. 1984); Note, supra note 7, at 1527; Note, supra note 3, at 100 n.34.
In addition to the fear of rendering the statute unconstitutional, Congress chose not
directly to prohibit membership in organized crime because of a concern that such a re-
quirement would "defeat the objectives of the legislation by making enforcement unduly
burdensome. . . ." Note, supra note 7, at 1527 (citing United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879,
885 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971)). "[I]t would be difficult if not impossi-
ble to prove that an individual or business was associated with or controlled by a clandes-
tine criminal organization." Roselli, 432 F.2d at 885; see 117 CONG. REc. 586 (1970) (state-
ment of Sen. McClellan).
48 See supra note 3.
49 It is suggested that a comparison of the language used in Sedima to describe racke-
teering activity, see 741 F.2d at 495-96, with the language of other courts that have required
a showing of an organized crime connection, demonstrates that the two requirements are
one and the same. In Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), for example,
the district court refused to uphold a civil RICO claim because the plaintiff failed to assert a
connection to organized crime. Id. at 113. In so doing, the Barr court defined organized
crime as "a society of criminals who seek to operate outside of the control of the American
people and their governments." Id. (quoting Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S.
1623, S. 1624, S. 1861, S. 2022, S. 2122, and S. 2292 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1969)(statement of Att'y Gen. of United
States)). Both the word "mobster" as used by Judge Oakes in Sedima and the phrase "soci-
ety of criminals" as used in Barr denote an individual working within a gang for a particular
illicit purpose. Compare WEBSTERS NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 732, 468 (1980) (mobster
defined as a "member of a gang"; gang defined as "group of persons working to unlawful or
antisocial ends") with id. at 1,094 (society defined as "voluntary association of individuals
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quirement that has been rejected not only by Congress, but also by
a majority of the courts and commentators.5
Under Sedima, it is imperative to comprehend what consti-
tutes "racketeering activity," since only when such conduct is pre-
sent is invocation of civil RICO proper.51 In its attempt to provide
some guidepost as to the term, however, the Sedima court referred
merely to conduct engaged in by "mobsters. '52 This implicit re-
quirement of an organized crime connection, it is submitted, vio-
lates a longstanding constitutional principle prohibiting the impo-
sition of liability due to membership in a group.53 Moreover, it is
suggested that if Sedima is interpreted alternatively as prohibiting
conduct rather than group membership,54 its requirement of a
for common ends").
50 See, e.g., In re Longhorn Sec. Litigation, 573 F. Supp. 255, 269 (W.D. Okla. 1983)
(RICO requires no connection with organized crime because no such requirement appears in
statute); Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc. v. Noto, 548 F. Supp. 352, 354 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) (plaintiff need not allege defendant is member of organized crime); Heinold Commod-
ities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313 (N.D. IM. 1979) (statute cannot be limited by
requirement of connection with organized crime); see Tarlow, supra note 25, at 305 & n.53
(requiring organized crime connection deemed to be a "form of improper judicial legisla-
tion"); Note, supra note 7, at 1106-09 (requirement of organized crime connection is "mis-
guided"); see also Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 392 (7th
Cir. 1984) (if scope of RICO to be restricted, it should be done by Congress, not courts),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 902 (1985). The Seventh Circuit recently noted that, although RICO
might create "a runaway treble damage bonanza for the already excessively litigious," the
role of the judiciary is not to "reassess the costs and benefits associated with the creation of
a dramatically expansive ... tool for combating organized crime." Schacht v. Brown, 711
F.2d 1343, 1361 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508, 509 (1983); see also Note, supra note
7, at 1120-21. It is not the role of the judiciary to limit RICO since courts are not authorized
"to create standing requirements that would preclude liability in many situations in which
legislative intent would compel it." Note, supra note 7, at 1120-21.
'1 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
52 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
53 The prohibition on status offenses disallows the imposition of civil liability solely
because an individual is a member of a group. See NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458
U.S. 886, 918-19 (1982). Liability may be imposed based solely on association only if the
group in question "possessed unlawful goals and ... the individual held a specific intent to
further those illegal goals." Id. at 920.
" Although it may be asserted that the Sedima court's requirement of an organized
crime connection falls within the Clairborne Hardware exception to the constitutional pro-
hibition of status offenses, see supra note 53, the Sedima court's racketeering injury re-
quirement contains none of the safeguards enumerated in Clairborne and refers merely to
"mobster" activity, see Sedima, 741 F.2d at 495. While reference to mobsters may connote
intentional wrongdoing, there is no limitation within the Sedima court's requirement that
the group possess unlawful goals, and, therefore, it is submitted that an unconstitutional
status offense is created. Cf. NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 919 (1982)
(government must establish that group possessed unlawful goals and that individual in-
tended to further them).
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"racketeering injury" is void for vagueness since the court defined
the term only by reference to a group that has historically eluded
specific definition,5 5 and is so vague that "men of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its ap-
plication . "56
CONCLUSION
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., the Second Circuit has im-
posed severe restrictions on civil RICO that not only contravene
the purpose of the civil provisions, but also render the statute un-
constitutional. Notwithstanding the observation of several courts
that RICO is currently being applied in areas far afield from what
was originally intended by Congress, it is suggested that the re-
quirements imposed by the Sedima court are inappropriate and
contravene explicit statutory language. Barring a congressional di-
rective otherwise, RICO should be applied in a manner cognizant
of congressional intent to "cast the net of liability wide" to ensure
its positive effect in eradicating white collar fraud. 7
Arthur J. Ciampi
55 See, e.g., United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 1970) (difficult, if not
impossible, to prove individual or business associated with organized crime), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 924 (1971); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 491 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (organized
crime is nebulous concept; definition would be of dubious benefit); United States v.
Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (legislative history defining organized crime a
murky water); see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Note, supra note 7, at 1527;
Note, supra note 3, at 100 n.34.
" Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (quoting Connally v. General Con-
str. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). The Court in Lanzetta held void for vagueness a New
Jersey statute that declared "any person ... known to be a member of any gang" a "gang-
ster" and, therefore, subject to punishment by fine or imprisonment. See Lanzetta, 306 U.S.
at 452. The Court held that the word "gang" was so vague that the statute was repugnant
and a violation of the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 458. Recently, the Supreme Court
articulated as the purpose for the void for vagueness doctrine "reduc[ing] the danger of
caprice and discrimination in the administration of the laws [and] enabl[ing] individuals to
conform their conduct to the requirements of the law ... " Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3256 (1984).
11 Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 1984) (Pratt, J., dissenting from the
denial of en banc consideration). In Furman, Judge Pratt wrote: "fraud is fraud, whether it
is committed by a hit man for organized crime or by the president of a Wall Street broker-
age firm." Id. at 529 (Pratt, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc consideration). Judge
Pratt reasoned that since Congress made no exception in the statute "for businessmen, for
white collar workers, for bankers, or for stock brokers," it is inappropriate for courts to
pardon these groups from RICO liability. Id. (Pratt, J., dissenting from the denial of en
banc consideration); see also Wall Street J., July 29, 1982, at 21, col. 3 (discussing use of
civil RICO against corporations such as Arthur Andersen & Co., Coopers & Lybrand, and
Shearson/American Express).
